What Was a Demand of the Populists Apex.
In many democracies, electoral shifts since the plow of the 21st century take forced big mainstream political parties to choose between two evils if they want to govern: either reach across the aisle and form a grand coalition with a traditional arch-rival political party or class a coalition with a populist, protestation or niche political party that has little or no governing experience. Federal republic of germany has seen the first solution since 2005, with the Christian Democrats preferring to govern with the Social Democrats rather than govern with the right-wing Culling for Federal republic of germany. Similarly, following the Irish 2020 general ballot, traditional rivals Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael contemplated governing together to avoid either of them having to govern with Sinn Féin. Other countries have experienced the second solution, thus bringing into authorities, for example, the Freedom Party (2000) in Austria, SYRIZA in Hellenic republic (2015), the V Star Movement in Italy (2018) and the Progress Party in Norway (2013). The political movements these populist parties represent have thus passed the terminal institutional hurdle ‘inwards toward the core of the political system’ (Rokkan
Reference Rokkan2009: 79).
Political scientists accept examined many aspects of the growing influence and new roles of populist parties (Mudde
Reference Mudde2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser
Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017). Some take studied why and when populist, protest and niche parties join government (Dumont and Bäck
Reference Dumont and Bäck2006); others have looked at how governing affects these parties’ balloter gains and losses, ideological changes and intra-party developments (Akkerman et al.
Reference Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Arter
Reference Arter2010; Deschouwer
Reference Deschouwer2008; McDonnell and Newell
Reference McDonnell and Newell2011). Yet, as emphasized by B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (Reference Peters and Pierre2019,
Reference Peters and Pierre2020), Bert Rockman (Reference Rockman2019), and Gerry Stoker (Reference Stoker2019), practically no systematic knowledge exists nearly how including populist parties in regime affects governance, and they call for such studies.
This article heeds the telephone call and contributes past taking upwardly the inquiry question: how is government affected by the inclusion of populists? More than precisely, we written report effects on governance capabilities (east.g. the expertise of executive politicians), cabinet conclusion making (e.g. the emphasis placed on collegial bodies), political–administrative relationships (e.1000. contact patterns and piece of work relations) and chatty concerns (that is, executive politicians’ concerns near how their political party, the regime and the bureaucracy are portrayed in the media).
Theoretically, we approach the research question from two perspectives. In the
perspective, the supposition is that governing has a normalizing/mainstreaming outcome (Deschouwer
Reference Deschouwer2008; Muis and Immerzeel
Reference Muis and Immerzeel2017; Tepe
Reference Tepe and Thompson2019) and that executive politicians from a populist political party therefore behave like those of whatsoever other party when in authorities. In the
perspective, past dissimilarity, populism does carry over to governing, and/or mainstreaming will not occur: a populist party maintains its exceptionalism, even in government, and will therefore be a different adversary for the political–authoritative establishment. Whether the normality or the exceptionalism blueprint dominates when populists are included in regime therefore has of import consequences for the functioning of authorities and public administration in autonomous societies (Peters and Pierre
Reference Peters and Pierre2019,
Reference Peters and Pierre2020; Rockman
Reference Rockman2019; Stoker
Empirically, this article uses survey data obtained from junior executive politicians (political advisers and state secretaries) from three long-lasting Norwegian governments roofing the menstruation 2001–20. In all, the 282 respondents represent 7 political parties, i of them a populist party (the Progress Political party). We compare the opinions, behaviour and experiences of politicians from populist and not-populist parties.
The results suggest that in Norway, ‘normality’ describes the effect of including populists in government more accurately than does ‘exceptionalism’. Populists in ability withal stand out by placing more accent on the party and less accent on the hierarchy than not-populist politicians exercise. That populists in this research context vest to a relatively well-established party suggests that some degree of exceptionalism is a feature one should expect to find in practically all populist parties that reach power. We discuss the generalizability of the findings further in the conclusion section.
- 1 Populism and populist parties
- 2 Populists entering government: normal or exceptional?
- 3 Research setting
- 4 Data and methods
- 5 Empirical analysis
- 6 Discussion
- 7 Decision
- 8 What Was a Demand of the Populists Apex
Populism and populist parties
The essence of populism is about society being divided into two antagonistic groups – the pure people and the corrupt elite – and populists believe politics should exist an expression of the virtuous people (Mudde
Reference Mudde2004). Although populism is a contested concept, most scholars seem to agree that people-centrism (virtuous people) and anti-elite orientation (decadent elites) are defining characteristics (Müller
Reference Müller2016). In addition, anti-pluralism is considered an essential feature: The people are morally good and their will is easy to identify simply, crucially, that will can merely exist represented by the populist (Müller
Reference Müller2016). The political and bureaucratic elites are decadent and volition therefore disrupt the will of the people.
Even though populists have anti-party sentiments, they are not confronting political parties, only the established parties (Mudde
Reference Mudde2004: 546). Hence, populist parties – that is, political parties that adhere to and signal the thin credo described above – accept go important players in Western European political party systems. The populist parties take received vast scholarly attention since the 1980s with emphasis placed on their electoral manifestos (Albertazzi and Mueller
Reference Albertazzi and Mueller2013; Font et al.
Reference Font, Graziano and Tsakatika2021), on explaining their electoral performances (Van Kessel
Reference Van Kessel2013) and on analysing the populist voters (Brils et al.
Reference Brils, Muis and Gaidytė2020; Hawkins et al.
Reference Hawkins, Rovira and Andreadis2020; Voogd and Dassonneville
Reference Voogd and Dassonneville2020).
Despite having entered parliamentary politics several decades ago, populist parties take merely relatively recently been included in governments. So far, studies of populist parties in government have focused on the electoral costs of governing and on intra-political party developments (Akkerman et al.
Reference Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Bolleyer et al.
Reference Bolleyer, Van Spanje and Wilson2012; Deschouwer
Reference Deschouwer2008; Van Spanje
Reference Van Spanje2011). Recently, some light has been shed on conclusion making in populist cabinets (Baldini and Giglioli
Reference Baldini and Giglioli2021) and on populist leaders’ attempts to transform the bureaucracy (Bauer and Becker
Reference Bauer and Becker2020). Populist parties equally equal or junior coalition partners remain under-examined, though, and the nowadays article thus fills a gap. By and large, investigating populists in government is an important contribution to the study of populist politics, as populism is too often considered an opposition phenomenon. As Jan-Werner Müller writes, ‘[t]he notion that populists in power are spring to fail is … an illusion. … [West]hile populist parties do indeed protest against elites, this does not mean that populism in government volition get contradictory’ (Müller
Reference Müller2016: 42). Adjacent, nosotros build on before work on populist parties and discuss in more item populists’ relation to governing. We depart from two main theoretical perspectives on the inclusion of populist parties in regime: normality and exceptionalism.
Populists entering government: normal or exceptional?
perspective departs from the notion that including populist parties in regime has a normalization effect on them (Deschouwer
Reference Deschouwer2008; Muis and Immerzeel
Reference Muis and Immerzeel2017; Tepe
Reference Tepe and Thompson2019). The reasoning is that in 1 primal sense populist parties are like, for example, parties with ties to the environmental movement of the 1970s, the peace movement of the 1960s and the labour motion in the late 19th century: huge responsibilities and tight interactions with coalition partners and the permanent bureaucracy have sobering and socializing effects on the party and its representatives. Individuals who enter the cabinet soon cast off outsider and protest sentiments they held while in opposition (Deschouwer
Reference Deschouwer2008). First-timers will often want to portray themselves as credible and responsible in lodge to establish a reputation for competence in function (Elias and Tronconi
Reference Elias and Tronconi2011; Heinisch
Reference Heinisch2003; Howard
Reference Howard2000), and the populists’ desire to govern might overcome their distaste for the career bureaucracy (Peters and Pierre
Reference Peters and Pierre2019). Also, populist parties may not brand the best utilise of their most vocal and visible politicians if they are in the executive co-operative of government. Experts in populist political communication tin can be more useful for a populist political party in the parliament. In that location, politicians are more free from the constraints placed on authorities ministers and junior ministers by coalition partners and by the prime minister. From the normality perspective, we would therefore expect populists to govern similar politicians from any other political party. Although some scholars accept focused on ideological changes in – and intraparty developments of – populist parties that enter government, few, if whatsoever, systematic investigations of the inclusion–normalization perspective exist (Muis and Immerzeel
Reference Muis and Immerzeel2017: 919; Tepe
Reference Tepe and Thompson2019).
A contrasting perspective is that populists remain
even in government. For a political party with a tradition of anti-system opposition, there is a strong incentive to go along the opposition role while in regime in order to reassure its core voters that the party has not sold out to the establishment (Elias and Tronconi
Reference Elias and Tronconi2011: 508). Below, we develop concrete expectations from the connected exceptionalism perspective in relation to governance adequacy, cabinet decision making, political–authoritative relationships and what we call communicative concerns.
Co-ordinate to Peters and Pierre (Reference Peters and Pierre2019), populist parties lack the capability to catechumen big ideas and popular slogans into public policies and to consider the minutiae of policy implementation. Populist parties are frequently relatively new and centralized and therefore have weak local political party branches compared with those of established mass parties. This weakness reduces their power to identify, recruit and develop political talents; they accept relatively shallow pools to depict candidates from, in one case they enter the government. Moreover, protest and niche parties rarely accept roots in vocational organizations, professional groups, educational institutions, regional associations or other milieux associated with governance capabilities. In patronage systems, limited admission to governance expertise can mean that populist parties lack candidates to fill political appointee posts in the hierarchy. In stricter merit systems, with political appointments being limited to executive politicians at the apex of authorities ministries, nosotros can expect populist parties to engage executive politicians who have less professional and political feel than those from large mainstream parties accept.
On the other hand, populist parties ‘will need to ensure that the members of their authorities squad (and their support staff) are competent’ if they want to have whatever chance of ‘achiev[ing] the party’southward strategic goals’ (Luther
Reference Luther2011: 454–455). Upon being included for the first time in the national executive government, populist parties tin thus be incentivized to place their most experienced representatives in the government: ones, for example, with experience from advanced positions in the legislature or from executive authorities at lower levels of government. Popular favourites can, as mentioned above, be more useful to the party in positions other than in the executive government.
In the normality perspective, that is, if ‘normality’ is the most accurate clarification of how populist parties tackle governing, we wait the same expertise among all parties in the chiffonier. In the exceptionalism perspective, nosotros expect less expertise among populist parties in the cabinet.
Cabinet determination making
Co-ordinate to Stoker (Reference Stoker2019: fourteen), ‘populism does not respect … core features of politics – the search for compromise betwixt different interests [and] the demand to understand another’due south position’. The art of reaching lasting compromises is of essential importance in multiparty governments, where different views exist between both policy sectors and political parties. Often, cabinet decisions cannot exist reached by choosing either policy selection A or B; ane must instead find a compromise that contains some of policy A and some of policy B, subsequently a menses of sounding out – that is, consultations and negotiations that give several interested parties some influence over the concluding decision (March and Olsen
Reference March and Olsen1983). In a chiffonier, negotiations can be held and decisions reached in both informal consultations and formal arenas similar cabinet meetings. Establishing effective mechanisms of intra-coalition decision making may prove crucial to solve conflicts in cabinets including populists (Luther
Reference Luther2011: 454–455). As Kurt Richard Luther emphasizes, yet, ‘the legacy of their anti-establishment rhetoric may brand for strained relations, at to the lowest degree initially’, and since populists lack regime feel they are ‘likely to exist at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their coalition partners’ (Luther
Reference Luther2011: 454–455). According to Stoker, populists lack the willingness and ability to search for compromise through ‘[g]overnance processes [that] are complex and deadening’ (Stoker
Reference Stoker2019: fourteen).
In the normality perspective, nosotros await a similar emphasis amidst all parties on collegial bodies in the cabinet. In the exceptionalism perspective, we would expect that populists would put less emphasis on collegial bodies in the chiffonier.
At the heart of the populist ideology lies the thought of the aristocracy and the establishment as the antagonists to the virtuous people (Mudde
Reference Mudde2004). For populists, civil servants are office of the aristocracy, and many populist parties that enter regime offices have a history of expressing highly sceptical views about the permanent civil service – a group with whom they must work closely while in regime (Aucoin
Reference Aucoin2012; Hart and Wille
Reference Hart and Wille2006). The civil servants are seen equally servants of the decadent system and must therefore be sidelined and isolated as much equally possible (Peters and Pierre
Reference Peters and Pierre2019), thus detaching executive politicians from the hierarchy (Drápalová and Wegrich
Reference Drápalová and Wegrich2020). As well, political–administrative relationships are expected to get inherently distrustful, for case, with politicians having relatively trivial conviction in civil servants’ willingness and ability to requite populist leaders what they demand in terms of supporting evidence, arguments, and politically responsive communication (Eichbaum and Shaw
Reference Eichbaum and Shaw2010).
In the normality perspective, we expect the aforementioned level of trust and contact between all politicians and the ceremonious service. In the exceptionalism perspective, we would expect less trust and less contact between populists in the cabinet and the permanent ceremonious service.
A strategy preferred by populist parties in government has been referred to as ‘one foot in, one foot out’; they have to influence policy on their core problems while maintaining their ‘outsider identity’ through ‘attention-grabbing statements’ and ‘spectacular actions’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell
Reference Albertazzi and McDonnell2010: 1319–1329). Past ‘standing to voice concerns of disaffected voters from a position of public office’, populist parties in government may ‘continue to evoke political discontent among their supporters’ (Haugsgjerd
Reference Haugsgjerd2019). This dissever strategy has been studied by looking at the external communication of populist parties (Albertazzi and McDonnell
Reference Albertazzi and McDonnell2010). Participation in coalition cabinets involves making compromises, resulting in watered-down policies that can exist difficult to sell to cadre voters. If they fear painful chiffonier compromises and dissatisfied voters, populists in government will be more concerned almost how their party is portrayed in the media and will care less nearly how the cabinet is described. As discussed to a higher place, populists are highly critical of the institution, including the civil service. Populists volition therefore exist less concerned about how government apparatuses such as the ministry, subordinate agencies and the policy sector appear in the printing.
In the normality perspective, we wait the same communicative concerns among populist and non-populist politicians. In the exceptionalism perspective, we expect populists to exist more concerned about their party and less concerned about the civil service than the not-populists are.
The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) was established in 1973 (as Anders Lange’s Party for Strong Reduction of Taxes, renamed the Progress Party in 1977) and obtained parliamentary representation the same year. Most scholars consider information technology a right-fly populist party and distinguish it from far-right populist parties (Bjerkem
Reference Bjerkem2016; Jungar and Jupskås
Reference Jungar and Jupskås2014; Rooduijn et al.
Reference Rooduijn, Van Kessel, Froio, Pirro, De Lange, Halikiopoulou, Lewis, Mudde and Taggart2019). Co-ordinate to other typologies, the Progress Political party also fits the complete populism category (Jupskås et al.
Reference Jupskås, Ivarsflaten, Kalsnes, Aalberg, Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck and de Vreese2016). Historically, the Progress Party built its electoral success on tax cuts, strict law and lodge, and anti-immigration policies. Over time, still, the party has developed a broad political contour and congenital a professional person party arrangement. On clearing policies, the Progress Political party has nurtured a respectable image and demonstrated a stronger commitment to liberal rights than take far-right populist parties in other countries (Akkerman and Hagelund
Reference Akkerman and Hagelund2007: 200). Different the Front end National in French republic and other right-wing populist parties, the Progress Party has stayed true to its conservative economic policies; the political party has non, for case, advocated for higher tariffs and other limits to complimentary trade (Jupskås
Reference Jupskås, Kriesi and Pappas2015; Otjes et al.
Reference Otjes, Ivaldi, Jupskås and Mazzoleni2018).
Due to the party’s anti-institution positions and long history of criticizing the ceremonious service, including immediately before the accession of the Solberg regime in 2013, political commentators called the Progress Party’s introduction into government ‘the acid test for the civil service’ (Salvesen
Reference Salvesen2013). After more than six years, the Progress Party left the Solberg authorities in January 2020. While in government, the Progress Political party controlled the Ministry of Justice (highly relevant for the party’s law-and-club and anti-immigration profiles), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Petroleum and Free energy, the Ministry building of Transport, the Ministry building of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry building of Children and Equality.
Norway is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty organisation, consisting of well-operation membership parties and frequent coalition cabinets (Allern et al.
Reference Allern, Heidar and Karlsen2016). The key administration comprises 15 ministries and the Prime Government minister’s Office. Each ministry has four to six expert departments staffed past tenured civil servants. Since the late 1940s the ministries accept had two types of executive politician positions in addition to the minister position: the political adviser position and the state secretarial assistant position. Land secretaries are mentioned in the Constitution. They are non part of the cabinet just serve equally ministers’ stand-ins and are generally of import actors in executive regime. Political advisers are formally appointed past the Prime Minister’due south Office and should be at the personal disposal of the minister; they tend to be relatively young and take limited or no executive powers (Askim et al.
Reference Askim, Karlsen and Kolltveit2017,
Reference Askim, Karlsen and Kolltveit2018). Since 2000, each ministry typically has had one political adviser and two state secretaries. Nosotros call both ministerial advisers (MAs).
Norwegian cabinets have long collegial traditions that include a cracking willingness to compromise. Cabinet decisions are formally made either within individual ministries or in the Council of State. In reality, however, the weekly cabinet meetings are the main loonshit for clarifying and settling disagreements between ministries or parties (Kolltveit
Data and methods
We draw on data from the three nigh recent Norwegian cabinets roofing a xx-year menses, 2001–twenty. More precisely, we rely on survey data of one-time MAs (state secretaries and political advisers) from three Norwegian cabinets. We compare the data obtained from executive politicians from the populist Progress Party with the data obtained from MAs from six other political parties: the Solberg regime (2013–today) consisted of the Conservative Party (2013–), the Progress Party (2013–20), the Liberal Political party (2018–) and the Christian Democratic Party (2019–). The Stoltenberg II government (2005–13) consisted of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Eye Political party. The Bondevik II government (2001–5) consisted of the Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Political party and the Liberal Party.
The initial list of respondents was drawn from the Political System Directory of the Norwegian Social Science Information Services. Email addresses were collected from the websites of respondents’ current employers or provided by the national secretariat of their political party. We used Questback to distribute the surveys and to collect the information. The field periods were 2015 for Bondevik II and Stoltenberg II, and 2018 and 2020 for the Solberg government. The response rate was college among MAs in the Stoltenberg 2 cabinet (76%, n = 145) than in the Bondevik II cabinet (65%, northward = 60) and the Solberg cabinet (54%, n = 77). No other indications of analytically important bias were plant in the sample. The frequency of non-responses to individual questions was negligible. All respondents received the survey after they had left government. The duration between their leaving authorities and their answering the survey varied, though; the time lag was longest for respondents from the Bondevik II authorities and shortest for respondents from the Solberg regime. All three legs of the survey contained questions about the MAs’ activities in regime, such every bit the types of advice offered to ministers, the types of assignment, the levels of responsibility and whether respondents could make independent decisions in the ministry. We cannot exclude the possibility of self-aggrandizement but have no reason to expect that information technology would vary systematically beyond parties or cabinets.
We operationalize governance capabilities as the experience of the MAs. The background and expertise of these MAs are measured through survey items asking virtually positions held before entering government. We compute an additive alphabetize counting the number of relevant positions held before date, both inside and outside politics (run across Table 1).
We operationalize cabinet decision making through four survey items asking about the importance of different strategies for cabinet decision making. ‘Thinking of issues that were solved at chiffonier level, how important were the post-obit arenas to attain an agreement?’ (scale from 1, not important at all, to 5, very important). Alternatives were: cabinet meetings, cabinet committees, bilateral talks with the prime minister, bilateral talks between ministers. We compute two mean indexes, one measuring the importance of collegial arenas and one measuring the importance of bilateral decision making.
We operationalize political–authoritative relationships using survey items covering MAs’ opinions well-nigh the competence of the civil service and items roofing MAs’ contact patterns. We measure opinions about the competence of the civil service with two items: ‘The civil service was able to take necessary political considerations into business relationship in their professional person recommendations’ and ‘Written material from the civil service provided a solid basis for political decisions’. We compute an index based on these two items (see Table 1). We measure out contact patterns with several items based on the questions: ‘How often did you have direct contact with the post-obit actors? Seldom/never, a few times a twelvemonth, monthly, weekly or daily?’ Nosotros compute two indexes from these questions, one measuring political contact and one measuring contact with the bureaucracy (see Table one).
Nosotros operationalize communicative concerns using survey items well-nigh how important information technology was for the respondents that diverse actors and organizations ‘appear in a good lite in news stories about the ministry’s policy surface area’. Nosotros compute two indexes based on these items, one measures political chatty concerns and the other bureaucratic communicative concerns (see Tabular array ane).
The empirical analysis is structured based on the analytical framework adult above. In Table two nosotros investigate all four dimensions of that framework and report viii OLS analyses showing the overall moving picture of Progress Party MAs compared with MAs from other parties in the surveyed cabinets. We volition comment on each dimension in plough, and when commenting we as well include more detailed data analyses to give a more comprehensive picture of differences and similarities between populists and non-populists.
Model 1 in Table ii showed that there was a significant difference in the work experience of populist and non-populist MAs. In Tabular array 3 we scrutinize the work experience of the MAs.
Prior to entering their government positions, MAs from the Progress Party had elected positions every bit members of parliament, mayors and local politicians to a slightly greater extent than MAs from non-populist parties. Withal, Progress Political party MAs had salaried non-elected (hired) positions in their political parties to a lesser extent than MAs from non-populist parties. The political feel of MAs is thus similar across the parties in the three cabinets, merely Progress Party MAs tend to have comparatively more experience from elected political positions and insufficiently less experience from salaried non-elected positions.
Progress Party MAs accept considerable feel from leadership/management positions, on a par with non-populists in the Solberg chiffonier and notably more so than MAs from the Stoltenberg and Bondevik cabinets have. It is specially in management feel from the private sector that these populist MAs stand up out. Finally, at that place are relatively only minor differences betwixt the populist and non-populist MAs when information technology comes to piece of work feel from public relations, political advice and direction consultancy. But again, populist MAs have more, rather than less, such feel than practise non-populists.
Concerning formal education – a variable not included in the regression analysis – the survey data show that Norwegian MAs in general have high levels of formal education. Notwithstanding, fewer populist than non-populist MAs have completed a higher education caste. 70-three per cent of populist MAs had a master’s caste, compared with 96% of non-populist MAs in the Solberg cabinet. In the Stoltenberg cabinet, 87% had a chief’s caste, and in the Bondevik chiffonier, 97%.
Overall, despite beingness a newcomer to authorities, the Progress Party’s history of governing at the local level evidently gives them a big pool of potential candidates for service at the national level. Similar observations take been made virtually populist parties in several other European countries as well (Drápalová and Wegrich
Reference Drápalová and Wegrich2020). The results besides confirm findings in existing enquiry that show that Norwegian MAs are comparatively well educated and experienced (Askim et al.
Reference Askim, Karlsen and Kolltveit2020).
Chiffonier decision making
Models two and 3 in Table two show no significant differences between populist and non-populist MAs when it comes to seeing collegial or bilateral conclusion making in the cabinet as important. Table 4, which gives a more detailed flick, likewise shows that populist MAs generally view decision-making processes in the same way as non-populists do. What stands out is rather that the prime number ministers’ different ways of organizing controlling processes in the cabinet are reflected in the answers. It is evident, for example, that prime number ministers Stoltenberg and Bondevik used chiffonier committees more actively than Prime Government minister Solberg did. When compared with their colleagues from other parties in the Solberg government, populist MAs place somewhat greater weight on cabinet committees, but other than that difference, MAs across parties in the Solberg cabinet are in agreement most the importance of the arenas for reaching agreement in the cabinet. Moreover, the standard deviation scores betoken that populist MAs are more than, rather than less, consistent in their opinions than are non-populist MAs.
In Model 4 in Table ii, we saw no difference between populist MAs and others regarding political–authoritative relationships. Table 5 shows in greater detail that MAs from all three cabinets agree that civil servants considered political matters when giving policy advice to the political leadership. Populist and not-populist MAs accept the same views about such functional politicization. Likewise, populists and non-populists have the same views about the adequacy of the written input political leaders could obtain from civil servants. Non-populist MAs from the Bondevik government in the early on 2000s expressed the virtually positive opinion on civil servants’ written input, simply the differences are non noteworthy. The takeaway is that MAs from all three governments, populists included, expressed a positive opinion on their working relationships with ceremonious servants.
Models five and half-dozen in Table 2 show that populist MAs have less contact with the bureaucracy and to some extent more contact with political party actors in parliament and in the party arrangement. Table half dozen shows the proportion of MAs that had been in daily contact with various actors inside and exterior the ministry. Here we come across clear differences, non so much between governments as between populist and not-populist MAs. Compared with other MAs, populist MAs had less frequent contact with leaders and caseworkers in the civil service and more frequent contact with their own political party, particularly their party leadership and the political party group in parliament.
If we compare country secretaries simply, and disregard political advisers, the differences between the populists and not-populists in the Solberg government increment. This increase is peculiarly evident in contacts with civil servants. For case, 74% of state secretaries from other parties in the Solberg government had been in daily contact with caseworkers compared with merely 42% of state secretaries from the populist Progress Party.
Models seven and 8 in Tabular array 2 indicate that populist MAs are somewhat more concerned than other MAs are about how their own party is portrayed in the media, while the 2 groups have similar concerns about how the regime bureaucracy is portrayed. In Tabular array 7, we investigate these relationships in more than detail. Hither we come across that fifty-fifty though most populist MAs are similar to non-populist MAs, there are differences worth emphasizing. A few populists practise not care near the chiffonier’southward being framed positively in the media, and they also tend to care less almost their policy expanse. However, almost all populists hold that information technology is very important that the minister (80%) and particularly the political party (90%) appear in a good low-cal in the media. Hence, although differences are small, the more detailed analysis shows there is a trend for populist MAs to be more concerned about the party and less concerned nigh the bureaucracy than other MAs are.
Different most research on populist politics, ours has non focused on balloter gains and losses, ideological changes or intra-party developments. We contribute instead to a so-far thinner stream of research, ane focused on consequences for government of including populist parties. If the normality blueprint dominates, the mechanism of executive authorities volition be unaffected by the entry of populists – in terms of the functioning of the machinery of authorities. (To be certain, normality does not hateful public policy is not afflicted by populist inclusion; public policy is outside the scope of this article.) In an exceptionalism scenario, populist parties crash government with, for example, depression-calibre personnel, distrust in the permanent bureaucracy, a disregard for cross-party compromises and footling business organization about how the government and the bureaucracy are perceived by the outside earth, every bit long as the party’s electoral support grows. At stake are therefore important aspects of governance and public assistants (Stoker
Reference Stoker2019). In the Norwegian context, given the results summarized above, normality is a more than accurate description than exceptionalism to describe what occurred when a populist party entered government for the first fourth dimension.
Empirically, nosotros used survey data from 282 ministerial advisers from one populist political party and vi non-populist political parties and three authorities cabinets in Norway. Cloth from inside executive politics is clearly of great value to research. Still, a potential downside of relying on insider material is that politicians, when asked nigh their ain roles, tin portray themselves in a positive low-cal or be secretive, and that populists may want to appear house-trained. Nosotros reduced vulnerability to such pitfalls by ensuring anonymity for the respondents, by collecting the information after respondents had left office and by giving respondents no clues to suspect that the exceptionalism of populists was a topic of interest. Surveying cabinet ministers rather than the junior executive politicians could also, potentially, yield different results. Cabinet ministers are, all the same, a group from whom it is notoriously hard to obtain information.
Furthermore, the study is limited to selected phenomena that could be affected past the inclusion of populists in government. That the results vary across these selected phenomena suggests that conclusions one can draw from a study such as this are vulnerable to the choice of outcome variables. Achieving robust knowledge about the normality and exceptionalism associated with populists attaining power requires studies covering more variables and other empirical contexts.
Likewise, we cannot on electric current prove distinguish clearly between normalization
and just plainly normal. The former refers to governing changing people and parties; the latter refers to populists having had their rough edges worn off by prior experience – for example, from parliamentary politics and governing at the subnational level – and to populism merely being unrelated to governing. Without additional information such as interviews with politicians and top ceremonious servants, the two explanations for populists governing ‘normally’ cannot be distinguished. On issue variables like the ones used in this written report, the behavioural expectations of the two explanations are largely the aforementioned. Future inquiry into the causes of ‘normality’ is therefore encouraged.
Moreover, if we assume ‘normalization’ explains ‘normal’ behaviour, whatever traits developed while in office might wane. Futurity inquiry should therefore strive to investigate the processes of normalization and exceptionalism in a longitudinal perspective to investigate the durability of normalizing effects of government inclusion. If normalization washes off, populist parties will return to authorities with refreshed exceptionalism afterwards a period of self-rediscovery in opposition – their hitherto natural habitat. Alternatively, normalization is more permanent, either past choice, based on the expectation that shedding populist ways brings a ‘respectability bonus’ (McDonnell and Werner
Reference McDonnell and Werner2018: 760), past habit, in that existence in government was a formative experience for a cohort of leading political party representatives, or by personal ambition, in that the same cohort of a sudden find life in opposition boring and want to find a way back into the regime offices. Also, as observed by David Art, beingness in power tin be a comprehensive and exclusive preparation course that upgrades the party’s representatives’ human uppercase, vets candidates for futurity executive duty and professionalizes the party organization (Art
Reference Art2011: 58).
Moreover, a party, not simply its senior political figures, tin switch from voter seeking to office seeking. Nosotros can speculate that the dynamics of possible reversion to exceptionalism are contingent upon, for example, the political profile of the regime, with greater political distance betwixt the government and the populist political party shortening the one-half-life of normalization. Also, normalization probable washes off more quickly if the populist political party experiences increased competition for votes from other populist parties, including single-issue parties.
The reverting-to-exceptionalism dynamics are likely too contingent on fourth dimension. Any normalization should occur first and foremost amongst the party’southward leading representatives, that is, the individuals who experienced the inside of the machine of executive regime, and information technology will accept time for normalization to trickle down through the party. Therefore, if the party is simply briefly in government, the party base will come out the other side relatively unaffected. Relatedly, if the populist political party next spends a long menses in opposition, the more the natural turnover of leading personnel will have peeled off the virtually ‘normalized’ layer of personnel, thus exposing the fresh wood of candidates with their populist exceptionalism intact.
By investigating how a populist party behaves when in regime for the first time, we contribute to scholarship on the growing influence and the new roles of populist parties in democratic societies (e.yard. Mudde
Reference Mudde2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser
Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017). I interpretation of our results is that achieving regime inclusion – that is, crossing the concluding threshold a political move or party must cantankerous to become an integrated office of the political organization – grinds populists’ hard edges down and turns populist parties into mainstream parties (Akkerman et al.
Reference Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn2016; Allern
Note, however, that our research design is double-edged. Surveying senior populist political figures who take recently quit government does bring a ‘fresh insider perspective’ advantage which is rarely seen in the literature. However, this data-drove strategy too comes with the adventure of overestimating the normality of the party at large. As discussed merely higher up, these senior figures and their insider entourages probably represent the most probable layer of the party in which to find ‘normality’, possibly individuals prepared and willing to fit in from the start. Scholarship on populist political parties has evidently gone across this layer to cover besides the grassroots activists, who in the short term may be unaffected by whatsoever transformation among the political party’s senior political figures.
Moreover, nosotros have not covered the behaviour of the party leadership. Some populist leaders are adept political communicators who have the power to maintain a populist profile irrespective of what the party really does in government, thus maintaining the support of the grassroots and the electorate. In short, insights about governance are not necessarily generalizable to other dimensions of ‘populists in power’, merely as insights about, for instance, the outward appearance of party leaders does not necessarily tell us the whole story of how the populist political party actually handles executive power.
Populist parties differ across and too within countries, and that brings united states to another note of caution related to generalization. Our results are to some extent shaped past our focus on a single populist party, Norway’s Progress Party. Although new to governing at the national level, and ‘populist’ per established categorizations, the Progress Political party has characteristics many will not associate with the notion of a populist party: almost 50 years of continuous parliamentary representation, substantial experience from governing at the subnational level and a party organization moulded on the mass-party model. Generalizing to political parties in other contexts – for example, parties with limited parliamentary experience – should therefore be done with corking caution. Other populists could comport differently if included in government, and any normalizing effect of governing might exist weaker than in the nowadays context.
More than inquiry is needed, ideally comparative studies with several populist parties, to get a fuller understanding of why populist parties behave in a certain way in executive government. This goes dorsum to the normalized
or merely ‘normal’ stardom. Populist parties might generally be less exceptional than many think, at least as far as governance is concerned – that is, the sometimes mundane work that goes on at a level beneath the boisterous populist rhetoric. Also, information technology might be useful to explore in future research whether there are dissimilar types of populist political parties, differentiated, for example, by the level of professionalism, moderation and concern about their wider reputation. Kingdom of norway’s Progress Party is in many ways comparable to populist right-wing parties in Denmark and Sweden – parties that for the past 20 years have chosen to be in faction with relatively mainstream bourgeois parties in the European Parliament rather than with Austria’s Freedom Party and other more far-correct populist parties (McDonnell and Werner
Reference McDonnell and Werner2018). Past implication, it might not have taken much transformation for a political party such equally Norway’due south Progress Party to become ‘normalized’. However, following this line of idea, one could consider the Progress Party a critical test for the notion of exceptionalism: that we practise find elements of exceptionalism, fifty-fifty here, suggests that such elements should exist more than probable in other contexts when other more extreme populist parties come up to power. Once more, only future empirical studies can help identify the importance of party characteristics, likewise of ones at levels below possibly likewise crude characteristics like ‘populist’.
In this article, we asked if and how regime is affected past including populists; the respond, given the Norwegian experience, is mixed. We found that, compared with non-populist parties, the populists appointed personnel with ample professional experience to office, adhered to collegial decision making and thought the bureaucracy delivered quality and were politically responsive. Populist executive politicians remained somewhat exceptional, though, in that they had more than frequent contacts with political party heavyweights and less frequent contacts with peak bureaucrats than not-populist colleagues had. Populists were concerned about the media coverage of the coalition government and of the hierarchy. However, compared with non-populist colleagues, populists were relatively more than concerned for their own political party and relatively less concerned for the government and the hierarchy.
The results from this study accentuate the importance of investigating the consequences of populist inclusion in government along not 1, but several dimensions. While populist executive politicians can be like to other executive politicians along some dimensions, on others they can differ to a greater extent. We accept shown that populists, when in power, think and deport much as other executive politicians from traditional political parties do, but we have likewise shown that as a group they remain somewhat different, if not exceptional.
What Was a Demand of the Populists Apex